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Abstract—The 5G mobile telephony standards are nearing
completion; upon adoption these will be used by billions across
the globe. Ensuring the security of 5G communication is of the
utmost importance, building trust in a critical component of
everyday life and national infrastructure.
We perform fine-grained formal analysis of 5G’s main au-
thentication and key agreement protocol (AKA), and provide
the first models to explicitly consider all parties defined by the
protocol specification. Our analysis reveals that the security of
5G-AKA critically relies on unstated assumptions on the inner
workings of the underlying channels. In practice this means that
following the 5G-AKA specification, a provider can easily and
‘correctly’ implement the standard insecurely, leaving the protocol
vulnerable to a security-critical race condition. We provide the
first models and analysis considering component and channel
compromise in 5G, whose results further demonstrate the fragility
and subtle trust assumptions of the 5G-AKA protocol.
We propose formally verified fixes to the encountered issues,
and have worked with 3GPP to ensure these fixes are adopted.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 5th Generation (5G) mobile networks and telecom-
munications standard is currently under development, and are
nearly finalised. A crucial building block in this standard is the
“5G Authentication and Key Agreement” (5G-AKA) protocol.
This protocol is developed by 3GPP, and is an evolution
of the AKA variants used in 3G and 4G, and is used to
authenticate and establish keys between the involved parties.
These parties include the subscribers, the networks within close
range (referred to as Serving Networks), and the subscribers’
carriers (referred to as Home Networks). The security of all
5G communication therefore crucially relies on 5G-AKA.
Traditionally, security protocols standards were not devel-
oped in tandem with rigorous security analysis, leading to many
vulnerabilities being found after deployment. More recently,
there has been a positive trend in which rigorous scientific
analysis has been part of the development process; most notably
IETF’s TLS 1.3 protocol [25], which has benefited from being
developed in tandem with a range of analysis methods [24].
Given the extremely wide deployment of 5G in the near future,
it seems prudent to perform state-of-the-art analysis for this
standard as well.
Methodology Our work aims to provide rigorous formal
analysis and to improve the security of the 5G-AKA stan-
dard. Our approach uses formal symbolic modeling with the
TAMARIN prover [21], which has been successfully used during
the development of major protocols such as TLS 1.3 [16].
Several aspects of the 5G-AKA protocol complicate formal
analysis. The first is the sheer complexity of the specification
documentation, which spans hundreds of pages. The second
is the complexity of the protocol, which involves four parties,
depends on sequence counters for its security, and complex
channel assumptions. The third is the informal nature of the
security requirements, which mean the modeler has to make
complex assumptions on the basis of the possible use cases.
We closely model the 5G-AKA specification: in particular,
we explicitly model all four main parties in the specification,
in which Home Networks include a separate component for
credential storage that may be implemented in e.g., a hardware
security module. We explicitly model possible assumptions on
the channels connecting these four parties. We then analyse
the resulting system model with respect to a range of threat
models, including compromised components and channels.
Related work Previous versions of AKA have been analysed
after deployment, and typically used simplified models.
The original 3G AKA protocol was manually analysed in
1999 [1], using TLA and BAN Logic. Both these methods
consider abstract models that are much coarser than modern
techniques, only considering very weak threat models.
In 2012, Tsay and Mjølsnes presented a vulnerability [26]
on the older UMTS-AKA and LTE-AKA protocols. This attack
allows for a violation of authentication properties based upon
session confusion. The attack in [26] was found indirectly
through use of CryptoVerif [13]. We will return to the relation
between this work and ours in VIII.
Køien [19] proposes improvements to 4G’s AKA, achieving
full mutual online authentication. Previous AKA protocols
delegate authority from the home network to a serving network
by forwarding up to 5 irrevocable authentication vectors,
allowing the home network to be offline during the challenge-
response phase of the protocol: this requires too high a level of
trust between network operators, hence they propose a modified
protocol which is fully online for all parties. 5G-AKA now
only forwards one authentication vector at a time.
Arapinis et al. [9] analyse 3G’s authentication protocols, dis-
covering attacks against the privacy and linkability of subscriber
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identities. This modelling and analysis uses ProVerif, formally
verifying the proposed solutions achieving unlinkability and
anonymity. O’Hanlon et al. [23] consider the interaction
between 4G’s authentication protocols and operator-backed
WiFi services; they detail how the interaction between these can
enable serious privacy violations, as well as their experiences
reporting the discovered issues to the relevant stakeholders.
Hussain et al. [18] combine symbolic model checking with
cryptographic protocol verification for 4G’s attach, detach, and
paging procedures, discovering 10 new attacks, including an
authentication relay attack, allowing an adversary to spoof the
location of a legitimate user.
In recent concurrent work [11], Basin et al. use a similar
approach to ours to analyse 5G-AKA, but focus on different
aspects. Basin et al. model and analyse a 3-party interpretation
of the 5G-AKA protocol and its security properties, merging
two major components (the AUSF and ARPF) to form a single
‘Home Network’ entity, similar to previous AKA versions.
They discovered the authentication issues created by lack of
integrity protection on the serving network’s ID. In contrast, we
model all four parties as defined in the protocol’s specification,
and consider a range of compromise models. In this sense,
our results are orthogonal: we focus on a more fine-grained
model with a large range of compromise models, while Basin
et al.’s models put more focus on detailed analysis of the
counter re-synchronisation method and the privacy guarantees
of 5G-AKA. They additionally model and analyse the ‘Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme’ which 5G-AKA uses
for SUPI concealment to ensure subscriber privacy. Beyond
simple confirmation of these results, we do not consider privacy-
specific properties within 5G. While in theory one would like
to model all aspects at once in a single model, the analysis of
the individual models is already very complex using current
technology: analysing a combined model does not yet seem
feasible. In practice, this means that the individual models
cover partially overlapping, but different classes of attacks. For
example, our model does consider attacks on privacy, whereas
the attack we detail later is not visible in the model from [11].
Contributions: We provide three main contributions. First,
we propose a fine-grained formal model of the 5G-AKA
standard that enables a detailed view of the interaction between
the various security-critical components.
Second, we perform symbolic analysis of this model with
respect to a range of threat models. Our analysis confirms
many already discovered issues and subtle assumptions and
requirements to achieve security in 5G-AKA.
Third, our analysis reveals that the security of 5G-AKA
critically relies on unstated assumptions on the inner workings
of the underlying channels. In particular, the automated analysis
discovers an attack that exploits a potential race condition.
We additionally show that solving the race condition for the
honest case does not necessarily prevent the attack. In practice
this means that solely based on the 5G-AKA specification, a
provider can implement the standard insecurely. We propose
fixes and prove that they prevent the attack. We have reported
our findings to the 3GPP SA3 working group and are working
with a major provider to integrate a fix to the standard.
The complete TAMARIN models can be found at [15].
Overview: We structure our work in three main parts.
In the first part, we describe the protocol (Section II), the threat
model implied by the standard (Section III), security properties
(Section IV), and its formalisation (Section V and VI.)
In the second part, we formalise and model a basic threat
model, and perform analysis in Sections VII to IX. We then
consider the modelling, analysis, results, and consequences of
stronger threat models that involve channel and component
compromise in Section X.
Finally, in the third part, we discuss the potential impli-
cations of these results, we discuss our interaction with the
3GPP working groups and upcoming changes to the standard
(TS 33.501 [5]) in Section XI, before concluding in Section XII.
II. THE 5G-AKA PROTOCOL
The 5G-AKA protocol is the “Authentication and Key
Agreement” protocol within the newly proposed 5G standard,
and therefore is the core building block for the security
guarantees of the standard. 5G-AKA has evolved from the EPS-
AKA protocol as used by 4G/LTE [7]. The 5G-AKA protocol
is specified within §6.1.3.2 of 3GPP Technical Specification
33.501 [5]; here we model version v0.7.0.
We distinguish between the “home network”, e.g., the
network that the user signed up with, and the “serving network”,
which is the actual network that the phone connects to. While
the home network can be the same as the serving network, they
are different in a roaming scenario.
The 5G-AKA protocol establishes authentication and key
agreement between a mobile device, a serving network, and
the device’s home network. The standard additionally spec-
ifies a credential repository, which resides within the home
network. The protocol is therefore specified as a sequence of
communications between four roles:
• UE: the ‘User Equipment’. This can be e.g., mobile phones
or USB dongles. Each UE is uniquely identified by its
SUbscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). In 5G, the SUPI
replaces the ‘IMSI’ in pre-5G standards.
• SEAF: the ‘Security Anchor Function’. In the roaming
context, this is within the serving network, e.g., the network
that the phone connects to in a remote location.
• AUSF: the ‘Authentication Server Function’. This falls
within the home network, e.g., the network of the phone’s
service provider.
• ARPF: the ‘Authentication credential Repository and
Processing Function’. In the home network. Often resides in
a secure location, e.g., a Hardware Security Module.
See Figure 1 for a diagram illustrating the parties and channels
in the 5G-AKA protocol; in this example, a mobile phone user
UE SEAF AUSF ARPF
e.g., Mobile Phone Authentication forserving network
Authentication for
home network
Credential Store for
home network
Insecure Secure Secure
Insecure Secure Secure
Fig. 1. Parties and channels involved in the 5G-AKA protocol. The dashed
box represents the 5G core network; dashed channels are considered ‘secure’.
2
is roaming, communicating back to their home network.
The UE and ARPF alone share the user’s long-term
secret symmetric key, K. The SUPI should never be exposed
publicly: a ‘SUbscription Concealed Identifier’ or SUCI is
used to achieve this. The SIDF, or the Subscriber Identity
De-concealing Function is used to decrypt a SUCI value into
a SUPI: this functionality is co-located with the ARPF.
At the end of a successful run of the protocol, all parties
can derive and agree upon an ‘anchor key’ KSEAF, from which
session keys for communication between the mobile device and
base station(s) within the local network are derived. After the
protocol, all communication between UE and the core network
uses this key or keys derived from it. The secrecy of the key
KSEAF is therefore crucial to ensure the security of subsequent
operations and communications.
Normal execution of the 5G-AKA protocol
We give an overview of the core of the 5G-AKA protocol
execution, as described in [5, §6.1.3.2]. We give the correspond-
ing message sequence chart in Figure 2.
1) SUCI, HN: The UE sends its encrypted ‘concealed ID’
(SUCI, encrypted with a variant of the Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme) and the name of its home
network to a SEAF in the serving network. In the case that
the SUPI is not concealed, it just sends the SUPI value
unencrypted.
2) 5G-AIR: The SEAF sends a 5G-AIR message containing
the previous message and the name of the serving network
to an AUSF in the relevant home network.
3) Auth-Info Request: The AUSF then transmits this
information in an ‘Auth-Info Request’ message to
the home network’s ARPF.
4) Auth-Info Response: The ARPF a) Requests de-
concealment of the SUCI into its respective SUPI from
the Subscriber Identity De-concealing Function, or SIDF.
b) The ARPF retrieves the relevant K for this user, and
c) Generates a 128-bit random number ‘RAND’, a single
AUTN value derived from RAND and the user’s long-
term key K, an ‘Expected Response’ value (XRES*), and
a session key for the AUSF, KAUSF. These are sent to
the AUSF in an ‘Auth-Info Response’ message. The
‘Expected Response’ value is a hash of the derived keys,
RAND, and SNID (i.e., the ID of the serving network being
used); possession of it enables other parties (which may not
know K) to verify that the user responded correctly.
5) 5G-AIA: The AUSF sends a 5G-AIA message containing
AUTN, a hash of the ‘Expected Response’ (i.e., HXRES*),
the new ‘anchor key’ KSEAF derived from KAUSF, and the
SUPI of the intended recipient.
6) Auth-Req: The SEAF sends RAND and AUTN to the UE
in an Auth-Req message.
7) Auth-Resp: The UE proves its identity, and implicitly,
ownership of K, by responding to the SEAF with RES*
(i.e., the ‘Response’) within an Auth-Resp message; the
UE can now calculate the keys KAUSF and KSEAF.
8) 5G-AC and 5G-ACA: The SEAF calculates the hash of
RES* (i.e., HRES*) received from the UE and checks it
matches the hash of the ‘Expected Response’, HXRES*
from the AUSF. If so, the SEAF considers the authentica-
tion successful, and sends an Authentication Confirmation
(5G-AC) message containing the user’s SUPI, the serving
network’s ID, and the response, to the AUSF. The AUSF
acknowledges this, replying with a 5G-ACA message.
5G-AKA is a natural evolution from previous generation AKA
protocols, and as such we find similarities between components.
Of note for this research, the pair of 5G components AUSF
& ARPF appear to have similar functionality to the pair of
2G/3G/4G components HLR & AuC (denoting respectively the
‘Home Location Register’ and ‘Authentication Centre’).
In the 2G-, 3G-, and 4G-AKA protocols, the specifications
consider the AuC and HLR as a single component, referred
to as the “HSS” or Home Subscriber Server. For example,
the 4G-AKA specification in TS 33.401 [7] does not even
mention the HLR (cf. AUSF). Previous research therefore only
models three components instead of four, with good reason: in
2G/3G/4G, the AuC does not participate in the AKA protocol
directly. The AuC generates various keys on demand but is not
a named party in the protocol’s message sequence flow.
In 5G both the AUSF and ARPF have separate, formally
encoded roles to play in the protocol specification, as explicitly
specified in the 5G-AKA specification in TS 33.501 [5]. We
therefore consider and model them as distinct components.
III. THREAT MODEL
The 5G-AKA documentation does not specify an explicit
threat model. Section 5 of TS 33.501 v0.7.0 [5], “Security
requirements and features” gives a mixture of threat models
and desired security properties from the perspectives of the
involved components, and we attempt to extract the most
important points relating to the threat model here. We refer
to this threat model as AStandard. We return to the required
security properties in Section IV. For transparency, we quote
the original documentation where possible.
A. Channel threat model
5G-AKA uses three network channels, as in Figure 1:
1) UE↔ SEAF
2) SEAF↔ AUSF
3) AUSF↔ ARPF
The communications between SEAF, AUSF, and ARPF are
within the “5G Core Network” and are specified to use “e2e
core network interconnection” channels. In Figure 3 we quote
the requirements of these channels from TS 33.501, which
suggest that SEAF↔ AUSF and AUSF↔ ARPF form a type
of secure channel. The required properties do not explicitly
require or guarantee delivery of messages, nor of ordering of the
receipt of messages. We believe these properties are analogous
(or very close) to setting up and maintaining long-term IPSec,
(D)TLS, or Diameter sessions over these channels, between the
named parties. We return to the subtleties regarding the precise
assumptions and formal modelling later in Section VII-B.
The standard does not specify any assumed security for the
channel between UE and SEAF, as the signal is over the air. In
some sense, providing security here is part of what 5G-AKA
aims to provide. We assume the channel between the UE and
SEAF is insecure, and model it using a classical Dolev-Yao
network adversary model.
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UE
K
SEAF AUSF ARPF
K
SUCI, HN 5G-AIR Auth-Info Request
Auth-Info Response5G-AIAAuth-Req
Auth-Resp 5G-AC
5G-ACA
Fig. 2. The normal flow of the 5G-AKA Protocol. Only the UE and ARPF know the user’s long-term key, K. Dashed lines indicate secure channels.
5.7.4: Requirements for e2e core network interconnection security
A solution for e2e core network interconnection security shall satisfy the
following requirements.
• The solution shall provide confidentiality and/or integrity end-to-end
between source and destination network for specific message elements
identified in this specification. [...]
• The destination network shall be able to determine the authenticity of
the source network that sent the specific message elements protected
[...]
• The solution should be using standard security protocols.
• The solution shall cover prevention of replay attacks.
Fig. 3. Requirements for e2e core network security (from [5] p. 21)
B. Component threat model
TS 33.501 v0.7.0 [5] does not describe whether it considers
compromise of components within the system as part of its
threat model. We assume that compromise of any core network
component (SEAF, AUSF, or ARPF) is not allowed in the basic
threat model, AStandard. The standard describes (Figure 4) the
protections required for the long-term key K within the USIM,
so we assume an adversary cannot compromise an honest user’s
key K. We do however assume that a persistent and capable
adversary would be able to compromise the long-term key(s) of
other USIMs, e.g., ones in its long-term possession. Separate
from our main analysis we consider a stronger threat model,
where compromise of components and secure channels are
allowed in Section X: AStronger.
IV. REQUIRED SECURITY PROPERTIES
TS 33.501 v0.7.0 [5] details security requirements on the
elements of the 5G ecosystem. We now detail the requirements
directly affecting 5G-AKA, and the security properties the
standard states or implies 5G should uphold. TS 33.501
contains the text describing “security requirements”, considering
confidentiality and integrity requirements; we cite this in Fig-
ure 6. Section 5 describes these requirements on Authentication
and Authorization; we include this in Figure 7.
A. Secrecy
TS 33.501 v0.7.0 [5] does not explicitly state a requirement
for the secrecy of the session key KSEAF (the “anchor key”);
possession of this key grants the bearer access to a network
on behalf of the UE which derived the key; Figure 5 alludes
strongly to the importance of the KSEAF, and its cryptographic
parent, the KAUSF. We consider session key secrecy to be one
5.1.4 Secure storage and processing of subscription credentials
The following requirements apply for the storage and processing of the
subscription credentials used to access the 5G network:
• The subscription credential(s) shall be integrity protected within the
NG-UE using a tamper resistant secure hardware component.
• The long-term key(s) of the subscription credential(s) (e.g., K in EPS
AKA) shall be confidentiality protected within the NG-UE using a
tamper resistant secure hardware component.
• The long-term key(s) of the subscription credential(s) shall never be
available in the clear outside of the tamper resistant secure hardware
component. [. . . ]
Fig. 4. Secure storage and processing of credentials (from [5] p. 16)
6.1 Primary authentication and key agreement
The purpose of the primary authentication and key agreement procedures
is to enable mutual authentication between the UE and the network and
provide keying material that can be used between the UE and network
in subsequent security procedures. The keying material generated by the
primary authentication and key agreement procedure results in an anchor
key called the KSEAF provided by the AUSF of the home network to the
SEAF of the serving network.
Keys for more than one security context can be derived from the KSEAF
without the need of a new authentication run. A concrete example of this
is that an authentication run over a 3GPP access network can also provide
keys to establish security between the UE and a N3IWF used in untrusted
non-3GPP access.
The authentication run also results in an intermediate key called the KAUSF.
The KAUSF may be left at the AUSF based on the home operator’s policy
on using such key.
Fig. 5. Primary authentication and key agreement (from [5] p. 25)
5 Security requirements and features
5.1.2 User data and signalling data confidentiality
5.1.2.1 Requirements on Support and Usage of Ciphering
• The UE shall support ciphering of user data between the UE and the
gNB.
• The UE shall support ciphering of RRC and NAS-signalling. [. . .]
• Confidentiality protection of the user data between the UE and the
gNB is optional to use.
• Confidentiality protection of the RRC-signalling, and NAS-signalling
is optional to use.
• Confidentiality protection should be used whenever regulations permit.
5.1.3 User data and signalling data integrity
5.1.3.1 Requirements on support and usage of integrity protection
• The UE shall support integrity protection and replay protection of user
data between the UE and the gNB.
• The UE shall support integrity protection and replay protection of
RRC and NAS-signalling. [. . .]
• Integrity protection of the RRC-signalling, and NAS-signalling is
mandatory to use, except in the following cases: [. . .]
Fig. 6. Security requirements and features (from [5] p. 15)
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of the primary goals of 5G-AKA, goal, even if unstated in
the specification. We therefore interpret the requirements from
Figure 4 as the following key secrecy properties:
S1. The adversary must not be able to learn the long-term
secret key K of an honest subscriber (stored within the
UE/USIM).
S2. The adversary must not be able to learn an “anchor key”
KSEAF for an honest subscriber derived by 5G-AKA, or
its cryptographic parent, KAUSF.
B. Authentication and agreement
5.10 Authentication and Authorization
The 5G system shall satisfy the following requirements.
Subscription authentication: The serving network shall authenticate the
Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) in the process of authentication
and key agreement between UE and network. [...]
Serving network authentication: The UE shall authenticate the serving
network identifier through implicit key authentication. The meaning of
‘implicit key authentication’ here is that authentication is provided through
the successful use of keys resulting from authentication and key agreement
in subsequent procedures. [...]
UE authorization: The serving network shall authorize the UE through the
subscription profile obtained from the home network. UE authorization is
based on the authenticated SUPI. [...]
Serving network authorization:
Serving network authorization by the home network: Assurance shall be
provided to the UE that it is connected to a serving network that is authorized
by the home network to provide services to the UE. This authorization is
‘implicit’ in the sense that it is implied by a successful authentication and
key agreement run. [...]
Access network authorization: Assurance shall be provided to the UE that
it is connected to an access network that is authorized by the serving network
to provide services to the UE. This authorization is ‘implicit’ in the sense
that it is implied by a successful establishment of access network security.
This access network authorization applies to all types of access networks.
Fig. 7. Authentication and Authorization properties required by TS 33.501
(from [5] p. 23).
We interpret the requirements from TS 33.501, notably
Figure 7, as the following agreement properties:
A1. The serving network and UE must agree on the identity
of the UE.
A2. The UE and serving network must agree on the identity
of the serving network.
A3. The home network and serving network must agree on
the identity of the UE (and upon agreement, the home
network confirms that the UE is a legitimate subscriber).
A4. The UE and home network must agree on the identity of
the home network.
A5. The UE and home network must agree on the identity of
the serving network (and this agreement implies that the
serving network is authorised by the home network).
A6. The UE, serving network, and home network must agree
on the anchor key, KSEAF.
A7. The anchor key KSEAF must not be replayable, i.e., the
UE, home network, and serving network agree that the
KSEAF has only ever been accepted by one session.1
We describe how we interpret, model, and analyse these
informally defined security requirements as more formal secrecy
and authentication properties in Sections VI-A and VI-B.
1Replay protection for all data is required and indicated at multiple points,
so we believe this is a reasonable goal for KSEAF as well.
V. FORMAL MODEL OF 5G-AKA IN TAMARIN
We formally model the four-party 5G-AKA protocol v0.7.0
[5] in the TAMARIN Prover.2 The explicit specification of
four parties within 5G-AKA is a change from UMTS-AKA
(3G) and LTE-AKA (4G), which describe three major network
components, rather than four. As we will see later, this opens
up new attack possibilities that are not covered if one models
AUSF and ARPF as a single entity, as done in [11].
Our modelling and analysis of 5G-AKA takes advantage
of the TAMARIN security protocol verification tool [21]. We
give an overview of the modelling assumptions we made (in
the context of 5G), and example 5G-AKA rules in its syntax.
A. Symbolic modelling
We use symbolic analysis, which means that instead of
concrete bitstrings, we consider abstract terms. For example,
the hash of a term x is represented as the term h(x). The
adversary can symbolically manipulate terms, e.g., decrypting
terms for which it knows the key. This corresponds to the black-
box model of cryptography often called perfect cryptography.
Depending on the threat model the adversary can eavesdrop,
insert, or block messages on channels, or may learn secret
information of any component or party it can compromise.
B. Modelling choices
Counters, ‘SQN’: The 5G-AKA protocol makes use of a
counter or sequence number, SQN. TS 33.501 [5] refers to TS
33.102 [4, §6.3.2] for the definition and behaviour of this term.
The standard explicitly acknowledges that counters wrapping
around could lead to repetition of a CK/IK3 key-pair, and gives
a method for protecting against this (“informative Annex C.2”
of [4]). We model counters as strictly monotonically increasing,
with no possibility of wrapping around.
We do not consider deltas, or allowed increases between
maximum previously seen counter values; we permit all SQN
values which are strictly greater than the current maximum
value. In this way, we are slightly more permissive than many
implementations of the standard may be; we do not believe
this affects our results. UEs and network operators are not
required to implement the given counter-measure; we discuss
the implications (or lack thereof) counters have overall on our
discovered attacks and further analysis in Section VIII-A.
C. Separation of components
5G-AKA is an evolution of the EPS-AKA protocol from
LTE/4G [7]; changes include the inclusion of concealed
identities or SUCIs, and the addition of the 5G-AC and
5G-ACA messages. Another important difference is the number
components formally described by the protocol standard. In
LTE/4G, the ‘Authentication and key agreement’ protocol
2These models have built upon and significantly diverged from initial models
of 5G-AKA v0.3.0 in the three-party setting, eventually leading to independent
concurrent work: [11].
3CK and IK are the (symmetric) Confidentiality and Integrity Keys
respectively, both generated from KSEAF, by both the UE and SEAF. A repeated
SQN would not lead to repeated CK/IK values directly as they are derived solely
from K and RAND, but if a protocol run can be replayed with a previously
seen RAND value (and the ARPF and UE will accept it), then the resultant
CK/IK will be the same.
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section of TS 33.401 [7, §6.1.1] describes just three components:
the UE,4 and the “HSS”, or Home Subscriber Server. In 5G
we have four components involved in the 5G-AKA protocol,
i.e., the UE, SEAF, AUSF, and ARPF. The SEAF and MME
are broadly analogous in functionality; the HSS’s functionality
is split between the AUSF and ARPF.
Other research modelling 5G-AKA only considers three
major components; it is therefore worth discussing in more
detail some of the reasons behind our choice to model four
components. Because channels between AUSFs and ARPFs are
completely internal to a telecommunications company’s network
and work over different mediums, we cannot assume that they
will be implemented similarly. As further context, we have
confirmation from a large telecommunications provider that
there are major differences between internal network security,
controls, regulation, and network implementation compared to
cross-network boundaries – in many instances we believe there
is often little to no internal network encryption at all, making
this scenario materially different to the one presented in [11].
The standard allows that other channels are implemented
by session bound local instances (preventing the attack pre-
sented by [11]) while the AUSF ↔ ARPF channel could
be implemented by a long-running connection that doesn’t
provide a similar binding. As we will show later, there is a
potential attack based on underspecified assumptions on the
AUSF↔ ARPF channel. This attack would not be prevented
by following the recommendations from [11] on the channels
that they considered in their work, since they did not model
AUSF↔ ARPF.
D. Modelling limitations
We do not model the counter ‘resync’ mode of 5G-AKA:
this is addressed by Basin et al. in [11]. We do not consider the
later derivation of keys within the key hierarchy after 5G-AKA
has finished. We also do not consider distinctions between e.g.,
the User Plane, Control Plane, Radio Resource Control, Access
Stratum, and Non-Access Stratum, except where these make
a difference to the 5G-AKA protocol’s behaviour. We do not
model the EAP-AKA′ protocol (described in [5, §6.1.3.1] and
RFC 5448 [10]) as it and the very closely related EAP-AKA
protocol have been studied in depth elsewhere [8], [14], [22].
Integrating a model of EAP-AKA′ into our models of 5G-AKA
would be useful future work: analysing their composition would
be useful and non-trivial, as EAP-AKA′ also makes use of the
same long-term key K.
VI. FORMALISATION OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
Having modelled 5G-AKA in TAMARIN’s multiset rewriting
rules, we now model the range of desired security properties as
(temporal) first-order logic formulae. These formulae are then
evaluated over runs of the protocol generated by the model.
As detailed in Section IV, and as cited in Figures 5 and 7,
TS 33.501 requires the informally described security properties
S1, S2, A1–A7. These lead us to believe that 5G-AKA should
uphold the more traditionally defined properties of session
key secrecy (which here implies long-term key secrecy), non-
injective agreement on the parties involved, and injective
agreement on the session key, KSEAF.
4Joint with the USIM; we model them as part of the same entity.
We consider session key secrecy, long-term key secrecy,
non-injective and injective agreement on a variety of terms.
A. Secrecy properties
We consider both session key secrecy (of KSEAF and KAUSF)
and long-term key secrecy (of K) for 5G-AKA.
The session key secrecy lemmas state that for all traces
where there was not a long-term key reveal action by the
adversary for the UE/SUPI in question, the adversary never
learns (or derives) the resultant session key, KSEAF (or in the
case of the ARPF, KAUSF). As defined in TS 33.501 Annex A.6,
KSEAF = KDFA(KAUSF, SNID); this is calculated at the AUSF.
If the adversary is in possession of KAUSF, they can derive
KSEAF, but not the other way round. The ARPF can clearly
derive KSEAF, but from the point of view of the ARPF we
consider the secrecy of the KAUSF to pin-point any compromise
precisely: adversarial knowledge of KAUSF implies knowledge
of KSEAF, but the reverse is not the case.
We consider session key secrecy from the point of view
of each of the four parties, as this captures a broader range
of properties than just secrecy for the UE. We do not just
consider the adversary being able to violate the secrecy of
what is ostensibly the correct session key, but also the situation
where an adversary can trick a party into accepting an incorrect
session key which the adversary knows or can derive. This
latter property also involves a violation of authentication, but
we discuss those properties in the next section.
The session key secrecy properties in the 5G-AKA models
are of the following form: 
1 lemma secrecy_UE:
2 "All UE t #i. Secret(<’UE’, UE>, t) @ #i
3 & not(Ex SUPI HN #r. RevealKforSUPI(SUPI) @ #r
4 & Honest(<SUPI,HN>) @ #i )
5 ==> not (Ex #j. K(t) @ #j )" 
Intuitively, for all traces such that a Secret action fact occurs
at the UE at time point #i for term t (the session key), and
there is no adversary key-reveal action for the same SUPI as in
use at point #i, then there does not exist a time point #j such
that the adversary learns or can derive that same term t. We
discuss use of the ‘RevealKforSUPI(...)’ action fact in
more depth in Section VII. We consider session key secrecy
properties of this form for all four of the protocol’s parties.
The long-term key secrecy lemma roughly says: for all
long-term keys (each bound to a specific SUPI), where that
key Ki (= K) was not revealed directly by the adversary, there
is no time point such that the adversary learns the long-term
key. This is modelled as follows: 
1 lemma secrecy_Ki:
2 " All SUPI Ki #i. LongTermKey(SUPI,Ki) @ #i
3 & not(Ex #r. RevealKforSUPI(SUPI) @ #r)
4 ==> not (Ex #j. K(Ki) @ #j)" 
We believe these lemmas model the informal properties S1
and S2. We provide full results for session key secrecy and
long-term key secrecy in Section VIII.
B. Authentication properties
As 5G-AKA considers four parties (each with different
roles), it is not sufficient just to consider traditional two-party
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authentication properties defined between the components in
possession of the long-term secret key, i.e., the UE and ARPF.
The authentication properties described below systematically
cover the range of pairwise authentication properties which we
believe the 5G-AKA protocol could be expected to provide.
For properties in the serving and home networks, we do
not expect 5G-AKA to create confidentiality, integrity, or
authentication guarantees between 5G core network parties.
The standard describes properties which must be guaranteed
by the underlying network connections, and we explore this
further in Sections III-A and VII-B. To analyse authentication
properties, we place Action Facts within protocol rules. We
consider pairwise agreement properties from the points of
view of each of the UE, serving network, and home network
(‘Commit’ Action Facts). These properties are then considered
in relation to each one of the four parties (UE, SEAF, AUSF,
and ARPF), who generate the relevant ‘Running’ Action
Facts. We do not consider agreement properties from the point
of view of the ARPF on its own, because: firstly, the ARPF’s
only role is to initiate the cryptographic section of the protocol
(generating RAND, AUTN, XRES*, and KAUSF); none of the
messages before the Auth-Info Request message involve
any keys, randomness, state, or other cryptographic elements;
secondly, no messages are returned to the ARPF.
We can combine the results from these pairwise properties
(agreeing on single terms) together to achieve the more tradi-
tional properties of e.g., non-injective or injective agreement
over the identities involved in the protocol run and a term such
as the session key, as described in [20]. Performing the analysis
systematically in this manner helps us to pin-point precisely
which terms (if any) cause any violations of agreement.
For example, if all three individual properties “UE and
ARPF agree on the identity of the ARPF”, “UE and ARPF
agree on the identity of the UE”, and “UE and ARPF agree
on KSEAF” hold true, this would imply the stronger, traditional
property from the point of view of the UE of non-injective
agreement between the UE and ARPF on the term KSEAF.
UE: From the informal authentication properties defined in
Section IV, we believe the properties directly concerning the
point of view of the UE are A1, A2, A4–A7. Achieving all of
these properties would be similar to achieving the traditional
property of injective agreement (as described in [20]) on the
identities of the UE, serving network, and home network, in
combination with the term KSEAF. We explore the full range
of properties from the point of view of the UE, considering
agreement with the SEAF, AUSF, and ARPF on the identities
of the parties, and the ‘data’ term, e.g., KSEAF.
Modelled formally, these properties follow the pattern
illustrated in the following example lemma: 
1 lemma agreement_UE_SEAF_ARPF:
2 "All a b c d t #i.
3 (Commit(a,<a,b,c,d>,t,<’UE’,’K_SEAF’>) @ #i
4 & not(Ex #r.
5 RevealKforSUPI(a)@r & Honest(<a,d>)@ #i))
6 ==>(Ex a2 b2 c2 t2 #j .
7 Running(b2,<a2,b2,c2,d>,t2, <’SEAF’,’K_SEAF’>) @ #j )" 
This example models agreement from the UE’s point of view
with a SEAF on the identity of the ARPF.
In more detail, this says: For all traces such that there
was a ‘Commit(...)’ Action Fact at the UE, where the UE
believes the parties involved in the protocol are a, b, c,
and d (instantiating as the unique IDs of the UE, SEAF, AUSF,
and ARPF respectively), and the UE believes that the session
key KSEAF is term t, and there was not an adversary key reveal
against the UE’s long-term key K, then there must exist at
least one ‘Running(...)’ Action Fact from a SEAF which
agrees with the UE on the identity of the ARPF. Note that
this specific lemma does not require agreement on any other
terms: e.g., the UE and SEAF involved in the specific Commit
and Running Action Facts could completely disagree on
the identity of the AUSF, or even on the identities of the
two directly involved parties, the UE and SEAF. Proving this
property true demonstrates non-injective agreement on just
the named term, in this case, the ARPF.
We then also consider injectivity: achieving injective
agreement requires agreement on the same terms (and/or parties)
as before, but now also requires that there must be precisely
one Commit(...) Action Fact with the specified term. As
all of the identities of the parties involved may reasonably
be used in repeated protocols, the only terms where we can
hope to achieve injectivity are the ‘data’ terms, e.g., KSEAF
and KAUSF.
Injective agreement lemmas are modelled similarly, but
now additionally require that there must not exist another
Commit(...) Action Fact agreeing on the same term t
at a different time point #k, i.e., such that #i and #k are not
the same event.
Serving Network (SEAF): From the informal authentication
properties defined in Section IV, we believe the properties
directly concerning the point of view of the serving network
are A1–A3, A6, and A7. The serving network shares privileged,
authentic, and non-replayable access to the 5G core network
through which it can communicate with the home network.
Before the protocol run, the SEAF does not share any secrets
relevant to the 5G-AKA protocol with any other parties, nor
does it generate any randomness, or maintain state beyond
each run of the protocol. We might ordinarily expect that the
strongest achievable authentication property with a confidential
channel would be non-injective agreement; however, as the
secure channel between the AUSF and SEAF is explicitly non-
replayable, we can potentially leverage this fact to achieve
injective agreement on the parties involved and the session key.
Home Network (AUSF and ARPF): From the informal
authentication properties defined in Section IV, we believe
the properties directly concerning the point of view of the
home network are A3–A7. Achieving all of these properties
would be similar to achieving the traditional property of
injective agreement on the identities of the UE, serving network,
and home network, in combination with the term KSEAF, as
described in [20].
While we separate the components of the home network into
the AUSF and ARPF for the sake of modelling the protocol,
we consider them to be much more closely related than e.g., the
relationship between the AUSF and SEAF. The ARPF receives
and sends only one pair of messages, and the contents of the
received Auth-Info Request message only indicate that
a party wants to start a protocol run; it does not contain any
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cryptographically generated or signed terms, or any randomness
generated by the initiator.
As the ARPF does not participate in the protocol after
sending the Auth-Info Response message, it cannot know
whether the UE responded to its challenge correctly or not.
As the AUSF has sufficient information to determine the
correctness of the response from the UE, and as the AUSF is
part of the home network, we consider the AUSF and ARPF
as a pair for the high level properties regarding authentication.
Hence, we consider the final group of authentication properties
from the point of view of the “home network”, rather than
either one of the AUSF or ARPF.
We analyse the full range of authentication properties
for each party communicating (directly or indirectly) with
each other party, and for the terms over which they might
meaningfully agree. We provide full results in Section VIII.
VII. FORMALISATION OF THREAT MODEL
We now consider how we formalised the threat model
described in Section III. As this threat model does not allow
compromise of components apart from other UEs (i.e., no
SEAF, AUSF, or ARPF compromise is allowed), we only need
to consider adversary key reveal (of other UEs’ long term keys)
and secure channel modelling.
A. Adversary key reveal
Distinct from other adversary actions we include a rule
allowing the adversary to compromise the long-term key K of
UEs other than the ‘honest’ UE we consider directly. When the
adversary triggers it, this rule outputs a user’s long term key K
to the public network channel, allowing the adversary to learn
it. When we specify security properties, we include restrictions
on the allowed events within protocol executions, such as when
the adversary may perform key reveals. We achieve this by
clauses preventing certain actions. To prevent the adversary
from revealing an honest actor’s long term K, we require that
there are no events (recorded by ‘Action Facts’) revealing the
key to the adversary. These Action Facts are parameterised
by the ID of the party the key is for, so we can allow the
compromise of any other long-term Ks, i.e., for other UEs.
B. Secure channel modelling
Within our 5G-AKA TAMARIN models we model the secure
channels within the 5G Core Network using the standard secure
channel abstraction, as used and described in [12]. This con-
struction replaces TAMARIN’s adversary-controlled Dolev-Yao-
style channels with secure channels where desired. This takes
the adversary-controlled In(msg) and Out(msg) facts, and
replaces them with secure channels. These facts are similar to
the form SndS(A,B,msg) and RcvS(A,B,msg), sending
the term msg from A to B, who are explicitly named parties.
We augment the standard construction very simply by including
a ‘channel name’, ‘SendType’, ‘ReceiveType’, and associated
metadata for ease of later channel and component selection
and analysis. In practice, the channelname term describes
which of the two secure channels the instantiation of the rule
considers, and looks like ‘seaf_ausf’ or ‘ausf_arpf’,
and the SendType and ReceiveType terms just contain
one of the strings ‘SUPI’, ‘SEAF’, ‘AUSF’, or ‘ARPF’.
This construction ensures that the adversary cannot read or
modify the contents of a message (msg) sent over this secure
channel; likewise, the sender (A) and recipient (B) of each
message cannot be modified or spoofed by the adversary.
By TAMARIN’s semantics, only rules with this fact in their
conclusion can produce a fact SndS(...), and only rules
with the fact RcvS(...) in their premise can consume it,
i.e., the Adversary cannot construct this itself. Assuming all
of the protocol’s rules are modelled and constructed correctly,
i.e., all rules of the protocol honestly identify the sender and
intended recipient, this will also guarantee the authenticity of
sender and recipient. N.B. This construction itself says nothing
about which session of the protocol the message was intended
for, nor the order in which messages are delivered.
Each ‘SndS(...)’ and ‘RcvS(...)’ fact can only be
consumed as a premise to a rule once. A message transmitted
through this channel therefore cannot be replayed by the
adversary; the adversary can only attempt to trigger the original
rule which invoked SndS(...) again, but this rule’s premises
will have to be satisfied again before this can occur.
We believe this construction very closely matches the “e2e
core network interconnection” channel requirements precisely
as described in [5, §5.7.4] (cited in Section III-A), and hence
we use it to model channels 2 and 3, i.e., the channels between
the SEAF and AUSF, and the AUSF and ARPF respectively.
VIII. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We have described 5G-AKA’s desired security properties
informally and formally in Sections IV and VI, and the threat
model under which we evaluate these properties. Our systematic
analysis has allowed us to reach conclusions about which of
these properties are upheld. We present our findings for secrecy
and authentication.
Secrecy properties:
S1. Secrecy of honest subscriber’s long term key K: 3
S2. Secrecy of anchor keys KSEAF and KAUSF: 7
Authentication properties:
A1. SN and UE agree on the identity of UE: 7
A2. UE and SN agree on the identity of SN: 7
A3. HN and SN agree on the identity of UE: 3
A4. UE and HN agree on the identity of HN: 7
A5. UE and HN agree on the identity of SN: 7
A6. UE, SN, and HN agree on KSEAF: 7
A7. Anchor key KSEAF must not be replayable: 7
As the results show, we encountered various secrecy and
agreement violations against 5G-AKA. The attack which
violates the secrecy of the anchor key KSEAF is of particular
interest, and we discuss this in some detail in this section. We
first give an informal overview of this violation before giving
an in-depth description. After describing the secrecy violation
in Section VIII-A, we consider the authentication violations in
Section VIII-B.
The attack proceeds in a similar manner to that presented
by Tsay and Mjølsnes’s attack against the three-party UMTS-
AKA in [26], which is between the serving network and home
network. In our four-party attack, we take advantage of a race
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condition over the AUSF ↔ ARPF channel entirely within
the home network (neither additional channel or component
is defined in UMTS-AKA or LTE-AKA), rather than the
SEAF ↔ AUSF channel at the interface of the serving and
home networks.
A. Secrecy violation
Overview: A malicious actor ‘B’ starts two 5G-AKA
sessions with a local serving network at roughly the same
time. One session is initiated by replaying an overheard SUCI
(of the target, user ‘A’), and the other session is with the
malicious actor’s own USIM and SUCI (for user ‘B’). The
sessions run in parallel, and result in a race condition; if this
occurs, the AUSF will be unable to distinguish between the
two responses containing the Authentication Vectors from the
credential store (ARPF), and is liable to associate the wrong
response (and resultant keys) with the wrong user. In the case
that this occurs, the AUSF and SEAF will incorrectly believe
that a set of Authentication Vectors and ‘anchor key’ were
intended for user A (and derived from user A’s long-term key
KA), when they were in fact derived from user B’s long-term
key KB. As a result, the malicious user B will now be able to
derive the anchor key, and use it to impersonate user A to the
network. See Figure 8 for the message sequence chart of the
attack.
What does the secrecy violation break?: We now give a
more in-depth description of the secrecy violation.
The specific violated property which we consider now is
the secrecy of the ‘anchor key’ KSEAF (and its cryptographic
parent, KAUSF), from the points of view of the SEAF and AUSF.
That is, at the end of the 5G-AKA protocol run:
• the SEAF, AUSF, and a UE will have agreed and be in
possession of a cryptographic anchor key, KSEAF,
• the SEAF and AUSF believe this key is for an honest
and un-compromised UE (in our example, user ‘A’ with
‘SUPI-A’ and ‘SUCI-A’), and,
• both the SEAF and AUSF believe this key is secret from
the attacker. It is not.
Thus, the protocol draft lacks a crucial containment property:
an attacker that can compromise or gain access to the long-term
key of a user (e.g., ‘B’) will be able to impersonate any user
(e.g., ‘A’) to the SEAF and the AUSF, because it knows the
KSEAF for a session that they believe to be for ‘A’.
Detailed attack scenario: The attack takes place in two
(possibly temporally and even geographically) separate phases.
In the first phase, the attacker eavesdrops and records a
legitimate encrypted/concealed SUPI, also known as a SUCI.
In the second phase, the main body of the attack takes place.
Full message definitions can be found primarily in TS 33.501
[5] (some are in TS 33.102, [4]). N.B. This can attack occur
even more easily if the SUPI is transmitted unconcealed, i.e.,
not encrypted into SUCI form.
Setup to the attack:
1) A legitimate user ‘A’ with ID ‘SUPI-A’ is registered with
its home network (HN). The attack does not require access
to its long-term key KA. This honest user initialises the
5G-AKA protocol, sending the SUCI-A (user A’s ephemer-
ally encrypted SUPI) and ‘HN’ to a SEAF. The user might
then complete the protocol as normal.
2) The attacker eavesdrops on the public radio transmissions
from the previous step, and records the message containing
SUCI-A and HN.
3) The attacker purchases a legitimate USIM from the same
home network as his intended victim; this has ID ‘SUPI-
B’. The attacker physically attacks and compromises the
USIM, and extracts the long-term key KB of this USIM in
its possession.5
Main phase of the attack: The message sequence chart of the
main phase of the attack can be found in Figure 8.
1) The attacker initiates the 5G-AKA protocol by replaying
to a SEAF the pre-recorded SUCI-A. The attacker sends a
message containing ‘SUCI-A’ and the name of the user’s
home network to a SEAF in serving network ‘SNID’.
2) The protocol proceeds as normal: the SEAF communicates
with an AUSF in the specified home network by sending the
‘5G-AIR’ message. This contains ‘SUCI-A’, and SNID.
3) In parallel with the first session, the attacker starts a
5G-AKA session for the USIM it owns (SUPI-B) with the
same home network, via the same serving network (and
SEAF). It starts the 5G-AKA session by sending its own
concealed ID (‘SUCI-B’) and the name of the home network
to the same SEAF as in the other, parallel session. The SEAF
correctly treats this as a separate session.
4) The SEAF communicates with the AUSF in the home net-
work by sending the ‘5G-AIR’ message, containing ‘SUCI-
B’ and SNID. The AUSF then sends the ‘Auth-Info
Request’ message to the home network’s ARPF.
5) The SIDF de-conceals SUCI-B into SUPI-B, and the ARPF
then responds by sending the ‘Auth-Info Response’
message to the AUSF. This message contains terms derived
from (the compromised) KB, and the terms RAND, SQN,
and SNID, but notably contains no reference to either the
SUPI or the SUCI.
6) The ‘Auth-Info Response’ message is received by
the AUSF, but as this message does not have a SUPI or
SUCI attached to it, the AUSF does not know whether
this message was for the session with ‘SUCI-A/SUPI-A’,
or whether it was for the session with ‘SUCI-B/SUPI-B’.
The AUSF can legitimately continue its session intended
for ‘A’ with the ‘Auth-Info Response’ message that
was actually intended for the session with ‘B’.
7) The AUSF then proceeds with the protocol, sending the
5G-AIA message for ‘SUPI-A’ to the SEAF; this contains
the anchor key KSEAF that the ARPF generated for ‘SUPI-
B’, but now the AUSF associates it with ‘SUPI-A’ (and as a
result, so does the SEAF). As the attacker has compromised
SUPI-B’s long-term key KB (and RAND and SQN are
publicly transmitted during the protocol), the attacker can
now construct the anchor key KSEAF that the AUSF and
SEAF now believe is the anchor key for ‘SUPI-A’. That is,
the attacker can derive the KSEAF that the AUSF and SEAF
believe to be for the (honest) ‘SUPI-A’ (and not ‘SUPI-B’
5After discussion with a senior security researcher of a global carrier, we
believe this physical extraction of KB is not necessary, although if this step is
completed, from a practical point of view this gives the attacker even greater
control over the timing and flow of messages.
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Fig. 8. The attack flows of the 5G-AKA Protocol, secrecy violation caused by session confusion.
which the attacker has compromised), completing the attack.
Counters or SQN values do not have any bearing on this attack,
as only the ARPF and UE store what the ‘correct’ value of
SQN is. The AUSF and SEAF do not use SQN directly in any
calculations or derivations, and hence do not check whether it
matches (or is greater than) stored values.
Replaying ephemerally encrypted SUCIs: In the concealed
setting, our vulnerability relies on the SIDF accepting a
previously replayed SUCI value. We discuss why we believe
that adversary-replayed values will be accepted in this context.
A UE sends an ephemerally encrypted SUCI to conceal the
SUPI, maintaining the privacy and unlinkability of the USIM’s
global ID. This attack does not violate that property. The UE
uses an ephemeral public key (rather than static) to maintain its
own unlinkability; hence the onus is on the UE to use a new
ephemeral key with each run of the protocol to maintain this
property. While the ARPF or SIDF maintaining a complete list
of previously used ephemeral public keys is touched upon as
a possible suggestion in the (formally withdrawn) Technical
Report TR 33.899 [3], we find no evidence within TS 33.501
that this is required or even formally proposed, and therefore
no evidence that an ARPF will not accept a re-used SUCI.6
Including a counter within the SUCI (then checked against
the highest seen value) is sufficient for the concealed setting, but
isn’t sufficient overall: when the null-scheme is used for SUPI
‘encryption’, the attack then holds again. In the non-concealed
case adding a counter isn’t sufficient: there are no cryptographic
protections at this stage, so the attacker can increment the last
counter it observed. TS 33.501 (notably [5, §6.12.2]) does not
mention a counter or any similar values within the SUCI.
Adding a counter prevents the attack described in this
document from succeeding (because replaying an overheard
SUCI will no longer be sufficient), but it means that an attacker
merely has to learn a target user’s un-concealed SUPI by some
means to be able to impersonate them. We believe the purpose
of concealed IDs is intended to maintain the privacy of the
user’s ID, and is not intended as a critical means to guarantee
the overall authentication properties of the protocol.
6TR 33.899 is a study collecting possible proposals from multiple authors
across 3GPP, some of which were considered for inclusion within TS 33.501.
This document has now been withdrawn, but gives insight into different
suggested proposals for 5G security from member companies of 3GPP.
B. Authentication violations
There are also multiple authentication violations, which
are listed in Section VIII. These fall into two categories:
authentication of serving network ID, and session confusion.
Authentication of the SNID: This is a genuine violation of
agreement over the identity of the SNID, as the UE never
learns this term in an authenticated message. This causes
agreement to fail on KSEAF, as this term is derived by the
UE from terms including SNID; the ARPF, AUSF, and SEAF
will derive an anchor key KSEAF on which the UE will not
agree if the adversary has injected an arbitrary SNID into the
UE’s (unauthenticated) serving network discovery phase.
This violation was originally discovered in concurrent work
by Basin et al. [11]. Our four-party models and analysis
confirms the existence of this agreement violation.
The adversary can inject an arbitrary SNID onto the
UE↔ SEAF channel: the UE then has no way of validating
the authenticity of SNID. The adversary must block the UE’s
Auth-Resp response message, as otherwise a genuine SEAF
would quickly discover that the UE generated HRES* and
AUSF generated HXRES* do not match. As the UE then does
not receive any rejection messages from the serving network,
it assumes the authentication was successful, and so from the
UE’s point of view, the protocol is finished. The UE will then
attempt to communicate normally with a nearby base station.
Outside of the definition of 5G-AKA, TS 33.501 excludes
this ‘attack’: see Section 5.10, cited in Figure 7. This attempted
communication and use of the KSEAF with the wrong SNID
after the protocol has finished will fail, but we agree that
this attack still violates serving network authentication in the
explicit sense. We leave the question of whether this violation
would allow the adversary any separate, meaningful benefit
for future work. We propose and formally verify a fix for this
authentication violation in Section IX-B.
Session confusion: Allowing sessions for different users to
be accidentally confused causes the violation of both secrecy
and authentication properties. The message flow behind many of
the authentication violations is the same as the secrecy violation
described in Section VIII-A. Here, session confusion occurs at
the same point, i.e., two sets of authentication vectors sent by
the ARPF are received by the AUSF at roughly the same time
resulting in a race condition, and the intended session for each
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is not reliably identified. We discuss broader implications of
the discovered vulnerabilities in Section XI.
IX. PROPOSED FIX
The essence of the session confusion-based attacks is
identity mis-binding. This leads to two ways to prevent these
attacks: binding the identities of the intended parties to each
message all the way through the protocol, or ensuring a one-
to-one mapping between the high-level 5G-AKA sessions and
internal AUSF↔ ARPF sessions. We propose the latter: while
both prevent the secrecy violation, we believe this approach
also upholds strictly stronger authentication properties than
using the UE’s identity as the session ID.
We have formally verified that this solution prevents the
secrecy violation and various authentication violations. We
provide full formal verification results for this in Section IX-B.
A. Proposed fix: tighter session binding
Session confusion is dependent on the ability of messages
between the AUSF and ARPF from one 5G-AKA session to
end up in that channel for another 5G-AKA session. Currently,
there is nothing in the specification that prevents this. We
propose the following method to prevent this:
The protocol should include a fresh (unique, random)
value in Auth-Info Request. The ARPF should include
this in Auth-Info Response, and the AUSF should
check that they match. To ensure similar session binding
across the SN / HN boundary, i.e., between the SEAF and
AUSF, the SEAF should also include a different fresh value in
5G-AIR; the AUSF should include the same value in 5G-AIA;
the SEAF should then check that they match.
This successfully binds the correct sessions to messages
at each stage of the protocol, preventing session mis-binding
attacks from occurring. We believe that this modification will
have a negligible impact on the efficiency of the protocol.
B. Verification results for proposed fix
We have formally analysed the properties of the 5G-AKA
protocol with the proposed fix from Section IX-A. Specifi-
cally, we include fresh values in the messages between the
AUSF ↔ ARPF and SEAF ↔ AUSF. While our session-ID
binding solution correctly fixes the secrecy violations and many
of the previous agreement violations, some of the properties,
particularly from the point of the UE, are still violated.
We state changed results compared to those from Sec-
tion VIII. now with tighter session binding: properties S1 and
A3 are still upheld; S2, A1, and A4 are now also upheld.
S2. Secrecy of anchor keys KSEAF and KAUSF: 3
A1. SN and UE agree on the identity of UE: 3
A4. UE and HN agree on the identity of HN: 3
This is a distinct improvement on the results from Section VIII,
but due to the lack of agreement on the SNID, A2 and A5–A7
are still not achieved.
Agreement on the ID of the SEAF: As discussed in
Section VIII-B, this is a violation of agreement over the identity
of the SNID, as the UE never learns this term in an authenticated
message. This causes agreement to fail on the term KSEAF, as
this term is derived by the UE from a series of terms including
SNID; the ARPF, AUSF, and SEAF will derive an anchor
key KSEAF on which the UE will not agree if the adversary
has injected an arbitrary SNID into the UE’s unauthenticated
serving network discovery phase.
Fix for SNID agreement violation, and verification: To
correct this violation of agreement, we propose that the SNID
is added to the definition of the MAC (defined in TS 33.102
[4]), as this is keyed by the long-term secret key, K. This would
redefine the MAC to: MAC = f1(K, <SQN, RAND, SNID,
AMF>) where it did not contain the ‘SNID’ term before. We
have formally verified that this minor change now allows
the 5G-AKA protocol to gain non-injective agreement on the
SEAF’s identity from the UE’s point of view, and both non-
injective and injective agreement on the KSEAF from the UE’s
point of view. We re-state the complete table of results from
the UE’s point of view with this final fix.
Secrecy properties under (Fix 1 + SNID fix):
S1. Secrecy of honest subscriber’s long term key K: 3
S2. Secrecy of anchor keys KSEAF and KAUSF: 3
Authentication properties (Fix 1 + SNID fix):
A1. SN and UE agree on the identity of UE: 3
A2. UE and SN agree on the identity of SN: 3
A3. HN and SN agree on the identity of UE: 3
A4. UE and HN agree on the identity of HN: 3
A5. UE and HN agree on the identity of SN: 3
A6. UE, SN, and HN agree on KSEAF: 3
A7. Anchor key KSEAF must not be replayable: 3
With these fixes, we believe 5G-AKA now explicitly achieves
all of its desired security properties in the symbolic model.
C. Alternative fixes
We have considered several alternative fixes, but they all
seem either more complex or insufficient. For example, one
might consider putting unique nonces in other ways in the
channels to solve this attack, especially since this is likely to
be implemented at a lower level due to engineering concerns.
Alternatively, one might create explicit identity binding, rather
than session binding. This would prevent the identity mis-
binding attack, but it would not prevent other agreement
violations. While the SUPI is globally unique, and hence
plausibly suitable as a session ID value, each session would
use the same ID, i.e., the SUPI. This does not prevent two
sessions from the same SUPI from becoming confused, which
would violate agreement on the resultant session key.
D. Session binding does not always imply security
It may be tempting to conclude that any solution to the
race condition (in the honest case) prevents the attack. It turns
out this is not the case. To prove this, we give an example of a
solution that succeeds in preventing honest session confusion,
and hence the race condition in the honest case, but is still
vulnerable to a variant of the described attack. The underlying
idea is that it is possible to prevent honest session confusion
in a way that can be subverted by an adversary.
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Assume the standard required the UE to choose a fresh
nonce and append it to the first message sent to the SEAF; this
otherwise contains the SUCI, SUPI, or 5G-GUTI. If this UE-
chosen nonce was then appended by all other parties (SEAF,
AUSF, and ARPF) to messages within this protocol run, this
would be sufficient to prevent honest session confusion. (If the
first message contained a SUCI or 5G-GUTI it would also not
reveal any information about the user’s identity.) The result
would be that without adversarial interference, each request
from the AUSF to the ARPF now uses a unique value, which
enables binding the response uniquely to the request.
This is not sufficient to prevent the secrecy attack. If the
‘unique nonce’ is chosen by the UE, a variant of the attack is
still possible: the adversary can repeat a nonce sent by an honest
UE, or it can use the same nonce twice. This leads to the AUSF
using the same nonce for two separate requests to the ARPF,
which enables confusion of the responses. This improves the
probability of session confusion, as no other honest sessions
should accidentally become confused with these two.
Our proposed fix in Section IX-A relies upon tighter session
binding, but avoids the above error by ensuring the adversary
cannot control the session binding term; the adversary cannot
influence it as the choice is made within the 5G core network.
There are many other engineering solutions which would
coincidentally prevent our attack, but we believe this demon-
strates that not all solutions to the problem of session confusion
necessarily prevent it. We believe this further demonstrates that
any solution required to prevent this attack must be mandated
by the protocol definition in the standard, and that security
critical details must not be left as an implementation decision.
X. COMPROMISED CHANNELS AND COMPONENTS
We now consider stronger adversary capabilities against
the previously secure channels and components: AStronger. All
of the following compromise of channels and components are
explicitly disallowed by the threat model within TS 33.501
(i.e., AStandard); these used to explore further the range of
security properties achieved by 5G-AKA in various compromise
scenarios. We now describe our modelling for compromised
channels and components, followed by analysis and results.
A. Compromised channel modelling
We consider compromise of each of the ‘secure’ channels
within the 5G Core Network. We model both read-only and
full ‘Dolev-Yao’-style channel compromise. We model this
automatically by adding to the previously described channel
communication rules: the definitions of send_secure and
receive_secure are still in place, but they are also
joined by definitions for new rules, send_insecure and
receive_insecure (see [15]). These allow us to cre-
ate fine-grained channel access for the adversary. For the
‘Read-Only’ compromise of channels, we do not include the
receive_insecure rule so the adversary cannot inject or
modify terms on the channel in question.
These rules allow the adversary unrestricted ability to access
any arbitrary channel: we limit the adversary’s behaviour to
accessing only a particular type of channel through the use of
‘restrictions’, matching against specific channels.
B. Compromised component modelling
We consider the compromise of one or more components
within the protocol.
Compromise of the SEAF and/or AUSF: Before a protocol
run, neither the SEAF or AUSF has any shared secret with
each other, the UE, or the ARPF within the 5G-AKA protocol.
Instead, they leverage their secure and authentic channel access:
this is what prevents the adversary from impersonating them
to other actors within the 5G core network.
To ensure secure and authentic 5G core network access, the
SEAF, AUSF, and ARPF will necessarily have some shared
secret(s), but this is explicitly performed at a lower layer of
the 5G core network compared to the 5G-AKA protocol.
Without other shared secrets, for modelling purposes,
taking over a component’s secure network channel ac-
cess is sufficient to fully impersonate the component; this
is the case for the SEAF and AUSF. This is achieved
through adding ‘component_compromised_send’ and
‘component_compromised_receive’ rules to the
TAMARIN models. As with channels, we restrict which com-
ponents the adversary can compromise.
Compromise of the UE and/or ARPF: The UE and ARPF
explicitly share secrets in 5G-AKA. As the UE does not have
secure network access, it is sufficient to give the adversary the
UE’s long-term key K. Within our models, to compromise the
ARPF, it is sufficient to compromise the initiating UE’s long-
term key K in combination with giving the adversary access
to the relevant secure network channel.
Compromise of other components: We consider two main
component compromise strands: first, if we compromise a
component of type X , we say the adversary can compromise
all components of type X ; e.g., allowing SEAF compromise
implies that all SEAFs can be compromised, whether these are
the ones in use by the particular run of the protocol which we
consider or not. We refer to this as “All-X”.
Second, we consider the case where the adversary may
compromise all components of type X apart from “mine”, e.g.,
if an honest component such as the UE thinks it is talking to a
SEAF with identity ‘SNID’, then it really is, and the adversary
has not compromised this specific SEAF; the adversary can still
compromise any other SEAF. We refer to this as “Not-My-X”.
The All-X scenario considers the importance of components
involved directly in the protocol; Not-My-X considers whether
an honest actor needs to trust all actors within the 5G core
network, or just the ones with whom it believes it is talking.
C. Compromised channels: analysis and results
Each channel-compromise threat model introduces new
challenges. The channel-compromise threat models which we
consider are: (1) No compromise (see Sections VII and VIII).
Read-only channels: (2a) SEAF↔ AUSF channel is readable
by the adversary, (2b) AUSF ↔ ARPF channel is readable
by the adversary, (2c) Both channels are readable by the
adversary. Dolev-Yao channels: (3a) SEAF↔ AUSF channel
is D-Y compromised, (3b) AUSF ↔ ARPF channel is D-Y
compromised, (3c) Both channels are D-Y compromised.
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Compromised channel results: Compromising secure chan-
nels has broadly the expected effect. All results assume adoption
of the channel-session binding fix. (1) See Section VIII for
‘no compromise’ results. (2a,b,c) Read-only compromise of
each of the SEAF↔ AUSF channel, AUSF↔ ARPF channel,
and both channels together causes all security properties to be
violated except S1, A3, and A4 (see Section IV). (3a) Full D-Y
(read/write) compromise of the SEAF↔ AUSF channel causes
all security properties to be violated except S1 and A4. (3b)
D-Y compromise of the AUSF ↔ ARPF channel causes all
security properties to be violated except S1 and A3. (3c) D-Y-
style compromise of both secure channels causes all security
properties to be violated except S1.
Even with strong session binding, D-Y or read-only compro-
mise of any secure network channel involved in the 5G-AKA
protocol is devastating for both secrecy and authentication,
especially (and critically) from the UE’s point of view.
D. Compromised components: analysis and results
Achieving results in TAMARIN for compromised compo-
nents has proved more difficult than the channel compromise
results, leading to fewer results terminating automatically. The
majority of the component compromise results were achieved
through manual direction of TAMARIN’s interactive mode, and
we provide descriptions of how to repeat these manual proofs
in the README associated with 5G-AKA.m4 [15]. Choice of
heuristic or manual intervention only affects termination and
the duration of computation, not the final result.
Our first scenario (All-X ) considers the importance of the
components involved directly in the protocol; the second (Not-
My-X ) considers whether an honest actor needs to trust all
components within the 5G core network, or just the ones with
whom it believes it is communicating.
a) Secrecy and authentication results: All-X : (1) Allow-
ing the adversary to compromise up to and including all SEAFs
causes all security properties to be violated except properties
S1 and A4 (see Section IV). (2) Allowing the adversary to
compromise all AUSFs causes all security properties to be
violated except S1 and A4. (3) Allowing the adversary to
compromise all ARPFs causes all security properties to be
violated except S1 and A3. We conclude that compromise
of any 5G core network component used by 5G-AKA has a
severely detrimental effect on the protocol’s security properties.
We now consider the results of component compromise
excluding the components with whom an actor believes they
are communicating, i.e., Not-My-X .
b) Secrecy and authentication results: Not-My-X : (1)
Allowing the adversary to compromise all SEAFs apart from
‘mine’ causes does not violate any security properties when
the SNID fix is adopted. A1, A2, A5, A6 are only achieved
with adoption of the SNID fix. We were not able to achieve
termination for A7. (2) Even with the SNID fix, allowing the
adversary to compromise all AUSFs apart from ‘mine’ causes
all security properties to be violated except S1, S2, A3 and
A4, although we believe these violations to be theoretical, and
not meaningfully instantiable. (3) Allowing the adversary to
compromise all ARPFs apart from ‘mine’ causes does not
violate any security properties when the SNID fix is adopted.
A2, A5, A6 are only achieved with adoption of the SNID fix.
We were not able to achieve termination for A7.
E. Discussion: AStronger
We have shown that preventing compromise of each core
component is essential for secrecy and authentication properties,
as all components have significant influence over whether
the protocol achieves the properties it seeks to uphold. For
the “Not-My-X” scenario, we believe our analysis further
demonstrates the importance of explicitly including the SNID
in an authenticated part of the protocol’s messages.
Compromise of secure channels has a similarly devastating
effect. Unsurprisingly, Dolev-Yao-like channel compromise
allows an adversary to violate most security properties. Read-
only access does not allow the adversary to break many
agreement properties between 5G core components; more
interestingly, this read-only access to either secure channel
allows the adversary to violate almost all agreement properties
from the UE’s point of view, as this new information allows
the adversary to impersonate a serving and/or home network
successfully to the UE over the insecure UE↔ SEAF channel.
The 5G specification requires lawful intercept capability,
whether enabled or not. Older (current) methods to implement
this are described in TS 33.106 [6]. The 5G specific methods
for this are described and explored in TS 33.842 [2], which
is currently at version 0.0.0 since November 2017, and is a
skeleton document with little to no detail. If one implements
lawful intercept by giving law enforcement read-only access to
one of the channels, our analysis implies that law enforcement
immediately also gains the power to impersonate. This would
violate the principle of least privilege. Given such subtleties, it
would be prudent to explicitly incorporate any lawful intercept
mechanisms in the security analysis of the protocol, such
that one can provide assurance that the additional mechanism
provides what is required by law, but does not accidentally
provide any further capabilities. Analyses like the one we
perform here are suitable for this purpose.
While the 5G-AKA protocol meets its desired security
properties after inclusion of our proposed fixes, it is still a
very fragile protocol. 5G-AKA loses the ability to uphold most
of its desired properties very quickly upon compromise of
almost anything outside of its explicit (relatively weak) threat
model compared to almost all modern key-exchange protocols.
XI. ATTACK IMPLICATIONS, DISCLOSURE, AND IMPACT
ON TS 33.501
The secrecy violation described in Section VIII-A allows
an adversary to impersonate another user to a serving network.
From the point of view of 5G-AKA this allows the attacker
to agree an anchor key (gaining serving network access)
dishonestly, under newly generated false credentials of a
legitimate user. This is a substantial containment problem.
The attack relies on a race condition between two sessions
of the protocol. The attack is probabilistic, and an attacker
would not be able to guarantee success; however, in any secure
protocol, there ought not exist any run of the protocol adhering
to the threat model which violates the security properties.
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N.B. This does not allow an attacker to decrypt any honest
radio traffic originally generated by the legitimate user.
A. Potential practical implications
In the real world, we conjecture that this attack might
allow an attacker to access a serving network in the name of a
legitimate user other than itself. This attacker could then bill
services, air-time, or access charges to another user; this is
clearly not the intended behaviour or level of security required.
We are not confident of the range of further authentication
and authorisation procedures which may or may not be in
place distinct from the 5G-AKA protocol, or any billing—
authentication procedures: e.g., whether specific billing actions
sent back to a user’s home network are tied to and verified
against a named anchor key or not. We note that an ARPF
would be able to establish that the anchor key was not for
the correct user; but that an AUSF or any other party without
direct access to the honest user’s long-term key K would not.
We believe it is plausible that once access is granted in the
form of an anchor key, this key is sufficient to allow a user to
perform the normal range of actions within a network.
We acknowledge that there may be other technical measures
within any real-world 5G network that make full implementation
of this attack impossible in the real world. Regardless, we
believe that any authentication and key agreement protocol as
defined must meet its own required security properties.
The real-world practicality of this attack will depend
on carrier-specific implementations, and to the best of our
knowledge these are not available. This makes it hard to provide
evidence of practicality, but we believe this research shows we
could easily create a ‘correct’ implementation of the standard
that makes the attack feasible. With access to a range of 5G
implementations, we hypothesise that we would find vulnerable
instances; at the time of research this was not possible.
The strongest statement we can definitively make is that the
5G-AKA protocol on its own does not meet its security require-
ments. However, as the primary method for authentication and
key agreement within 5G, we believe that 5G networks should
not rely solely upon secondary mechanisms for security; we
believe this is sufficient reason on its own to fix the protocol
to prevent this and similar attacks.
B. Liaison with 3GPP SA3 and CT4
At the time of writing, 5G (and 5G-AKA) is not yet an
implemented, used, or complete standard; our publication of this
work was intended to highlight issues during the standardisation
phase, rather than after it has been finalised. As a result, we
communicated directly with the relevant working groups.
After discovering the secrecy violation, we prepared a
document describing the vulnerability, its potential implications,
and our proposed fix. We then contacted members of the 3GPP
SA3 (Security) working group, informing them of our research,
and requesting they read and comment upon it.
Following the document’s distribution, we received mostly
supportive feedback from members of SA3 and other re-
searchers. Some SA3 members did not view the vulnerability
as an issue with TS 33.501, suggesting that it was not the
standard’s responsibility to ensure security, and that individual
vendors could introduce further measures to guarantee security
if they desired. We respectfully but strongly disagree.
Senior security experts from a global carrier kindly helped
us to prepare a Change Request [27] to TS 33.501. They
submitted this on our behalf to 3GPP SA3. As a result of
our publicly released document and change request, SA3 have
stated that they believe our described race condition could arise,
and that they need to ensure its mitigation. This has resulted in
a formal liaison document detailing our described mis-binding,
and how this could lead to parties being “unable to correlate
the different responses to the respective requests” [17].
The liaison document requests of 3GPP working group CT4
whether they agree that this lack of binding is present, whether
it has been taken into account, and if so, how the race condition
is avoided (requesting reference to the relevant specification).
Finally, the document attaches a change request by another
global carrier, which is proposed as a solution. This is a generic
adaptation of our proposed fix from Section IX-A.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
In this research we have demonstrated issues within the
draft 5G-AKA protocol, particularly one which, if unmitigated,
could potentially allow a malicious actor to impersonate an
honest user to a network. We propose a possible fix, and we
have verified its correctness using the TAMARIN Prover. We
have worked with 3GPP, encouraging them strongly to adopt
our proposed fix, and are pleased with the progress made here.
We believe our results demonstrate the importance of fine-
grained component-based formal modelling: without this level
of detail in modelling, we would not have discovered the
presented race condition.
We recognise that standards often make implicit assumptions
about the reality of engineering solutions, and that there may
be other mechanisms in place which in practice mitigate the
real-world impact of this protocol vulnerability. It might be
tempting to think our attack would be prevented if underlying
layers (accidentally) provide session binding, but we showed
in Section IX-D that this need not be the case. Regardless of
whether or not implementations at lower layers accidentally
prevent the described attack, our analysis demonstrates that
such mechanisms would in fact be security-critical.
We emphasise that security critical properties of any
protocol must not depend on implicit engineering solutions;
the specification of a standard should be such that any correct
implementation provides the desired security properties. This
is not true for the modelled TS 33.501 v0.7.0, [5], or the latest
version at the time of writing, v15.1.0.
Many of the encountered issues are exacerbated by con-
tinued reliance on symmetric cryptography. We recognise that
legacy considerations restrict the choices available to protocol
designers, but continuing to rely solely on symmetric cryptog-
raphy seems wholly inadequate in 2018. Future standards could
achieve much stronger security properties in authentication and
secrecy with the introduction of a modern, asymmetric key-
exchange mechanism at the core of any new ‘AKA’ protocol.
Identity binding and protocol design is tough, especially
within complex, multi-party protocols with subtle assumptions.
14
We believe that the discovery of these issues further demon-
strates the importance of systematic automated verification for
security-critical functionality and protocols.
Finally, we want to emphasise the importance of com-
munication between academia and industry: as we describe
earlier, Tsay and Mjølsnes [26] discovered a very similar style
attack across a different network boundary in 2012, but when
designing 5G-AKA, 3GPP do not appear to have taken this
into account. If they had, we believe our presented vulnerability
could also have been avoided. When we contacted 3GPP with
our report, not a single reply mentioned this previous research.
While the implications of some of the issues we discuss
can be subtle and tricky to convey, we need to ensure these
can still be communicated to industry clearly and accurately.
Some parties may not yet be used to receiving and acting upon
results and feedback from academia. In spite of this, in our
view, it is important to continue to analyse systems, providing
feedback to the relevant stakeholders, ensuring that our research
is received, read, and most importantly, acted upon.
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